

AIR

ECBA- 12718

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MAR 18 1954

Chief, AB

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Info: COM (attn: C)

Operational/CART/CARBON

IS
CABIN

CABIN/CART Relationship

REF: A. EBNK-2571
B. EBNK-3647
C. DIR-32918
D. SRAK-2664
E. ECBA-11485
F. ECBA-11486
G. ECBA- 12717

1. Recent developments in both the CABIN and CARBONHYDRATE cases highlight the need for a current evaluation of the basic CART responsibility for CABIN operations in order to clarify the precise limitations of the informal but real security responsibility which BOB/CART now exercises with respect to the conduct of CABIN projects.

2. Given the fact that this phase of BOB/CART's function has at best been ill-defined and ad libitated in the past, it is also felt equally desirable to delineate the precise functions of the CABIN section in its future relations with CABIN.

a. Subsequent to the revelation of CARBONHYDRATE's Service connection, reference "C" above recommended that CARBONHYDRATE be turned over to the exclusive control of the CABIN/CARBONHYDRATE case officer, pointing out certain advantages which would accrue to the more efficient operation and increased security of CARBONHYDRATE thereby.

b. It is concomitantly true that there exist certain fallacies in the CART/CARBONHYDRATE relationship which make a change to exclusive CABIN control of CARBONHYDRATE desirable from several points of view:

Approved by: _____

11 March 1954

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- (1) The equivocal position of CARBONYL himself certainly detracts from the efficient accomplishment of his assigned duties in the CADMINT organization, since regrettably certain members of the CADMINT staff look upon him as a control mechanism employed to pry into their conduct of CADMINT affairs.
- (2) At the same time, CARBONYL has on occasion found himself in receipt of specific instructions from his case officers which have then been counter-acted by his CADMINT superiors.
- (3) It is further noted that the absence at operational meetings of the CADMINT/CADMINT case officer requires an exchange of paper, and in some cases a definite lapse before appropriate remedial action can be taken. The CADT case officer must first prepare a contact report, and then an inter-office memorandum to make certain that all issues become a matter of the written record.
- (4) Moreover the CADT case officer cannot be fully cognizant of all aspects of CADMINT operations, so that in some cases he is not qualified to make specific recommendations concerning points which CARBONYL raises; this is, of course, particularly true when the CADMINT/CADMINT case officer is detained by other duties.

c. It is therefore the intention of MSS/CADT, in accord with references "C", "D", and "E" above, to deliver CARBONYL to exclusive CADMINT control, as soon as the practical mechanics of this change can be worked out.

d. Once CARBONYL has become the exclusive charge of CADMINT, it is clear that a further re-examination of the CART/CADT mission is in order for a number of cogent reasons:

- (1) The removal of CARBONYL from direct CADT control in effect removes the last vestige of direct insight into CADMINT operations, and constitutes a change from the previous remote and intellectual intervention of CADT in the daily conduct of CADMINT affairs.
- (2) The recent appraisal of the CADT mission and its fulfillment by POC have led to the inescapable conclusion that a concerted effort must be made towards the accomplishment of the primary function of CADT as an aggressive weapon against the RIS and the SIS.

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To this end, it becomes clear that in its more passive CANF functions (the investigation of flaps, the staff function of preparing general recommendations in the field of operational security, etc.) a considerable reduction must be made; hereafter no direct intervention in the daily conduct of B&B operations in general as opposed to specific cases as the need arises is feasible or desirable if the aggressive CANF effort is to have a minimal chance of success.

- (3) It is equally obvious that the acute shortage of CANF case officers makes it even more incumbent upon the section to assign its qualified personnel to the contemplated aggressive operations against the RIA and the SIS. By the same token, however, it is precisely the qualified CANF case officer who should exercise those staff functions of a CANF nature which concern other B&B and CANBAIN operations. In order to resolve the apparent paradox presented by this situation, it is presently contemplated that the new function of operational security officer, under the R&B Operations Officer, will in time be incorporated into the B&B organization to exercise precisely that continuous scrutiny of the daily conduct of all B&B operations.
- (b) In the daily operational conduct of B&B operations, it is further not reasonable to expect that the minutiae associated therewith should become the subject of correspondence between R&B/CANF and CANBAIN. The latter undoubtedly realizes that any attempt by CANF to intrude upon the operating level of CANBAIN operations would be catastrophic to all concerned; therefore, such a course of action must for practical reasons be excluded a priori.
- (5) In the light of the equivocal situation which is currently in the process of resolution, it is practically impossible for any CANF case officer to remain fully conversant with the multiple phases of CANBAIN operations, nor is it further desirable for him to belabor the R&B case officers for operational details which in essence do not constitute an integral part of his present function as "security officer" for the projects concerned. Clearly then, a more precise formulation of this security responsibility is indispensable to the continued function of R&B/CANF in an

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advisory capacity, and to the further maintenance of a viable, efficient and timely coordination of G-3/ATF activities with the G-2/ATF section, where appropriate.

a. Given the varied factors which constitute a impressive weight of evidence to support the contention that a close re-examination of CART functions is in order, the following paragraphs will attempt to set forth the future G-3/CART - G-2/ATF relationship as it is presently being evolved.

b. First and foremost, following the transfer of G-3/ATF, the position of G-3/CART must become analogous to that of the military staff: it can conduct only general supervision of ongoing operations and offer its comments and recommendations thereon when matters of interest to CART appear. Further, when the specific need arises, direct intervention by G-3/ATF on an ad hoc basis may be required, yet such an involvement in the operational details of any project must be considered an emergency and purely transitory measure to be employed solely in extreme cases; and only in those cases where the opposition service has clearly appeared as a matter of purely staff interest or as a security threat to the operation at hand, as opposed to simple intervention to enforce operational security practices.

b. In view of the decreased yet more realistic and effective role which the G-3/CART section will play in the future conduct of G-3/ATF operations, a number of possible solutions are set forth for the conduct of the daily CART (in the generic sense of the word) supervision of G-3/ATF projects:

a. Basically, the responsibility for the operational security of any project must rest squarely on the shoulders of the case officer concerned. This principle means simply that each case officer must be expected to manage his projects with a reasonable and average sense of operational security, and make the basic decisions affecting it which are required by the daily requirements of his operations. A further point which militates in favor of this principle is the fact that most NSA/CART case officers have at least as much, if not more, experience than the large majority of the junior CART case officers, and are thereby as well equipped to exercise this security function personally. This general rule not only applies to, but is the fact concerning every other operational section at NSA.

b. Ultimately, however, it may be possible to incorporate a trained CART officer into the structure of G-3/ATF who will be in a position to exercise this function in a much more detailed manner if that is considered necessary. We feel in this respect, however, that insufficient grounds exist for special CART treatment to G-3/ATF operations over any other NSA operation.

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a. Within the near future, however, the position of operational security officer within the BOB organization will become a reality, and it is precisely this senior member of the staff who will bear the responsibility for all BOB operations which CAFI has in a general way exercised with respect to the conduct of various projects in the past.

5. The implementation of these new arrangements for BOB operational security will find the position of BOB/CAFII to be as follows:

a. The primary efforts of BOB/CAFII will be devoted to its aggressive penetration efforts against the DIB, DIF and the SIS, and all other functions will of necessity be subordinate to this basic mission and effort.

b. In spite of the preclusive nature of this future orientation and direction of the CAFII effort, it should be stated that the section still stands ready to offer general recommendations commensurate with its secondary role in a staff advisory capacity. Such a function would of necessity be on broad, general CAFII matters, leaving the immediate resolution of daily operational problems to the appropriate case officers. This generally is the position which BOB/CAFII occupies with respect to other segments of BOB, and this is the only manner in which DIF can do justice to its overall mission.

c. Further, where emergencies do arise requiring the direct intervention of the CAFII section in an active operation, then the group stands ready to contribute substantially of its time and efforts to the immediate resolution of a temporary crisis, always with the understanding that the CAFII section will revert at the earliest opportunity to its primary functions and advisory capacity as soon as circumstances permit.

6. As for the present, however, pending the establishment and activation of a BOB operational security officer, the immediate change we are now implementing as far as CAFII/CAFII relations are concerned is two fold:

a. Transfer of CAFII/CAMPAK to CAF ALB case officer.

b. Delegation of all other DIB/DIF matters concerning this limited field, as it CAFII/CAMPAK, CAFII/CAMPAK, to same position occupied by DIB/CAFII, DIB/CAFII, DIB/CAFII and DIB/CAFII in relation to BOB/CAFII.

c. An internal CAFII/CAMPAK memorandum will record the actual mechanics necessary for the fulfillment of the changes outlined herein.

7. We are convinced that such changes not only will not lessen the effectiveness of CAFII/CAMPAK relations heretofore maintained, but will represent a distinct improvement in the fields of personnel relations, RUEKII amalgamation, and Headquarters efficiency.

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